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Maritime piracy in the Somali territorial waters has been 
the focus of attention of international society for at least twelve 
years, and indeed the crime of piracy threatens international 
peace and security in a region through which half of the world’s 
crude oil passes. In the three-decade absence of a Somali State, 
intervention by the Security Council is required to suppress such 
crimes and ensure freedom of maritime navigation. The Council 
resolutions based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter call for the 
Member States of the United Nations to arrest and bring to trial 
those accused of piracy before national courts. It is necessary 
for the States that are involved in anti-Somali piracy efforts 
to incorporate the principle of universal jurisdiction into their 
national laws and adopt new laws criminalizing modern piracy, 
which is outside the traditional notion of piracy stipulated in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The freedom of international maritime has always been one 
of the most important concerns of the international community 
because waterways and high seas are the routes through which 
most global trade passes. The primary hazard faced by ships is 
unrelated to the sea itself, but is related to the maritime piracy 
committed by groups with the only aim of stealing cargo or 
even ships themselves. Nowadays, the international community 
has shown rare solidarity against this crime by prosecuting 
perpetrators, destroying their ships and places of gathering, and 
describing pirates as enemies of humanity. Because this crime 
threatens international peace and security, the International Law 
of the Sea was established as a legal framework in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.
Traditionally, maritime piracy was practised in specific 
regions of the world, especially in the Caribbean and the Gulf 
of Malacca in East Asia, but in the past decade this piracy has 
emerged strongly in West and East Africa, specifically the Gulfs 
of Guinea and Aden. Directly or indirectly, it has caused global 
economic losses. From the Gulf of Aden alone these have 
reached tens of billions of US dollars. For example, half of the 
global supply of crude oil passes through this area, in addition to 
ships carrying various cargoes.1
In Somalia, marine piracy and armed robbery have been 
concentrated in the Somali Territorial Sea, and it affects most 
This work is licensed under         
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1. According to reports issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
losses resulting from piracy in the Gulf of Aden reached more than 18 billion USD 
in 2006-2013. Moreover, the total sums paid as ransom for the kidnapped vessels 
was over 413 million USD (2005–2013), at a rate of USD four million per vessel. 
See : Drobenko, La piraterie saisie par le droit, 21 Neptunes revue (2015) 3; available 
at: https://cdmo.univ-nantes.fr/neptunus-e-revue/annees-2015/
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of the commercial ships passing through the Gulf of Aden. The 
problem here is that the Somali Interim Government announced 
that it was unable to exercise criminal jurisdiction to pursue 
and prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes despite this 
jurisdiction being in accord with both its constitution and 
international law. The status of Somalia as a failed State has 
prompted the UN Security Council to ask Members of the UN and 
even regional organisations such as European Union and African 
Union to pursue pirates in both the Somali Territorial Sea and on 
the mainland, and to place them before their national court or 
before the courts of another country.2
The importance of the current Somali case is that, despite 
international efforts to suppress and eradicate piracy, it has 
been suppressed, but not eliminated, as the Somali Government 
announced. Since March 2017 until the time of writing, no ship 
hijacking or ransom demands have been reported. However, they 
may recur at any moment once the current coercive measures are 
relaxed and international military forces are withdrawn. For this 
reason, it is important to ask whether the existence of a failed 
State leads to the spread of crimes such as maritime piracy, and 
whether the presence of piracy and armed robbery in this failed 
State justifies the intervention of other States seeking to suppress 
these crimes and prosecute their perpetrators. 
2. CAUSES OF PIRACY IN SOMALIA: A RECENT 
PHENOMENON
According to the international law, States exercise 
jurisdiction within their national borders. Accordingly, criminal 
jurisdiction is exercised by national authorities. The most 
prominent of these is their personal jurisdiction over all their 
lands, territorial seas, and airspace, no matter how high. Any 
act that constitutes a criminal offence under the State’s national 
law obliges them to pursue and prosecute perpetrators before 
national courts, and they alone have the right to establish and 
implement rulings on their territories.3 Alongside the countries 
such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti, Somalia 
is called a failed State. Such a State cannot provide the right 
to protection and security for its citizens, execute penal law 
throughout its borders or confront the perpetrators of crimes. In 
Somalia, this failure is due to the collapse of the political regime 
in 1991, after the escape of the former President Mohamed Siad 
Barre,4 and the disintegration of the national army, police, and 
security forces. This dramatic event prompted individuals to 
establish armed militias not subject to the law, and control over 
cities and rural areas was ceded to civil warlords.5 The Somali 
State thus fragmented virtually, if not legally, into two parts: 
Somaliland, and Puntland in Northern Somalia.6 Local authorities 
and institutions were set up in both regions to manage the 
affairs of cities and regions, and to control security, but the south 
suffers from armed conflicts that started in 1992 and are ongoing. 
Armed militias were established which have weakened the State’s 
authority and powers under the Constitution. In addition, there 
has been a clear and public spread of terrorist groups.7
Since its independence from Britain in 1960, and until 
the 1980s, there were no known piracy incidents in the Somali 
Territorial Sea.8 The first incident was in 1989, at the beginning of 
the collapse of the political regime and the rupturing of the State. 
In that year, an armed opposition movement called the Somali 
National Front became active in the north, in what is known today 
as Puntland. Backed by Ethiopia, the group held four commercial 
ships legally sailing across the Somali Territorial Sea and an 
Italian tanker called Kwanda. The kidnappers claimed to have 
two motives: to reveal to the world the weakness of the Somali 
government through its inability to secure protection for foreign 
ships and to show that the Somali National Front was the most 
appropriate protection for shipping. Consequently, permission 
to enter the Somali Territorial Sea should be sought from the 
opposition movement and not the government. Scholars 
of international law consider that the Somali National Front 
borrowed this illegal practice from activities carried out by the 
Polisario (the Front in the Western Sahara), when it forced fishing 
2. Twenty-one countries responded to this call, often through the deployment 
of warships, including African countries (Kenya, the Seychelles, Tanzania and 
Mauritius), Arabian countries (Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia), Asian countries (China, South Korea, India, Taiwan and Japan), European 
countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia 
and Italy), and the United States. Mainiatas, La Piraterie en Afrique, 23 Neptunes 
revue (2017) 2 ; available at: https://cdmo.univ-nantes.fr/neptunus-e-revue/
annees-2017/
3. Silva, Somalia: State Failure, Piracy, and the Challenge to International Law, 50 
Virginia Journal of International Law (2010), 554.
4. President Mohamed Siad Barre took control of Somalia in 1969 and ruled by 
fomenting disunity among the various clans, and by promoting the Darod clan. He 
was deposed from power by the General Mohammad Farah Aideed
5. Martin, La Répression des Actes de Piraterie Maritime : Développements Récents en 
Matière de Poursuites et Détention des Pirates Somaliens’ LVI Annuaire Français de 
Doit International (2010) 517; available at : https:// persee.fr/docAsPDF/afdi_0066-
3085_2010_num_56_1_4623.pdf
6. Garrod, The Emergence of Universal jurisdiction in Response to Somali Piracy: 
An Empirically Informed Critique of International Law’s Paradigmatic Universal 
Jurisdiction, 18 Chines Journal of International Law (2019) 576; available at : 
https://academic.oup.com/chinesejil/article-abstract/18/3/551/5625568?redirect
edFrom=fulltext
7. Farah, Maritime Trade and Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean (1994-
2017), April Journal of Transportation Security ( 2018) 2; available at : https://www.
springer.com/journal/12198
8. The author limits of the, maritime zones according to UNCLOS1982 as following: 
-The territorial sea extends to a limit of 12 nautical miles from the baseline of a 
coastal State. -The contiguous zone from the outer edge of the territorial sea to a 
maximum 24 nautical miles from the baseline. -The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
is the largest sea area, which cannot exceed 200 nautical miles from the base line.-
The high seas are characterized by the principles of free use for all States. For more 
read the UNCLOS 1982.
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vessels to seek permission from itself and not the Moroccan 
authorities. Unfortunately, what happened in Somalia after the 
forced departure of Siad Barre and other regime members, and 
less than a year after the 1989 Somali incident, was the contrary 
to what the Front itself declared when it hijacked the ships. 
Neither the Front nor other opposition movements that emerged 
later made any effort to control the Somali Territorial Sea. Thus, 
an area of 120,000 km2 lacked control and authority.9
This lack of control on land and at sea created lawlessness 
in Somalia, and led to the outbreak of piracy discussed here. 
Perhaps the most prominent of the acts of piracy concern illegal 
fishing by ships belonging to European, Asian, and African 
countries without any government control or licencing. Even 
today, ships from Japan, France, Spain, Pakistan, Taiwan, South 
Korea, and Sri Lanka practise illegal fishing in the Somali Territorial 
Sea despite the Security Council resolutions, the latest of which 
from December 2019, condemning these actions.10 Moreover, 
since the late 1990s, other crimes under international law have 
also become widespread, i.e. the burial and disposal of nuclear 
waste and contaminants in the Somali Territorial Sea, human 
trafficking, and trading in Yemeni Qat. The latter has found a large 
market in this region and on the coast in particular.11 Regarding 
maritime piracy and armed robbery, in the period 1990–1998, 
the International Maritime Bureau did not record any piracy 
incidents in the Somali Territorial Sea, but after 1998 the office 
began receiving information about ship hijacking, especially in 
the territorial sea opposite the Puntland region.12
It would seem that, when seeking the reasons for 
the emergence of piracy in Somalia, the fall of the Somali 
government and the rule of lawlessness since 1991 stand at the 
forefront. However, scholars of international law retain this is 
not the only justification. If we take Nigeria as an example, we 
can see it has a strong federal government and is a member 
of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
Nevertheless, it suffers from pirate groups having emerged there 
and spread widely. These peoples including the pirates believed 
that the misallocation of national wealth, especially oil, among 
various regions in Nigeria led to widespread poverty, specifically 
9. Amirelle, La piraterie maritime en Afrique contemporain, 116 Revue de Politique 
Africaine (2009) 105 ; available at : https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d769/8025ec
10. The Security Council stated in its Resolution ( Expressing serious concern over 
reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) in Somalia’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), recognizing that IUU fishing can contribute to destabilization 
among coastal communities, and noting the complex relationship between IUU 
fishing and piracy,) . See: S/RES/2500/2019, adopted in 4 December ,2019, p. 3 ; 
available at : www.un.org
11. Edem, Lutte contre la piraterie maritime par des gardes armes à bord des navires: 
Conflit de compétences entre Etats de pavillon et Etats côtiers-La nécessite de 
mécanismes de coopération’ 21 Neptunes revue 2015) 2 ; available at: https://
cdmo.univ-nantes.fr/neptunus-e-revue/annees-2015/
12. Drobenko, La piraterie saisie par le droit, 21 Neptunes revue (2015) 3; available at: 
https://cdmo.univ-nantes.fr/neptunus-e-revue/annees-2015/
in the south. When ships loaded with goods and products pass 
the Nigerian coasts and the poor see them, this prompts them 
to seize the ships or at least hijack them for ransom.13 The same is 
true for Somalia. Millions of Somalis suffer from poverty and lack 
of work opportunities, and this has led some to resort to violating 
the law by committing crimes for money, such as seizing ships 
inside the Somali Territorial Sea in order to gain the ransom.14 
However, alongside the factors of the fall of the Siad Barre 
regime and poverty, the importance of other factors must not 
be diminished. One is the widespread access to weapons within 
the civilian population of Somalia, caused by the disintegration 
of the army, police, and security forces. Another is that, since the 
British and Italian colonisation of the country ended, many tribal 
conflicts erupted which pushed people to arm themselves. For 
this reason, the Somali society is considered to be one of the most 
armed in all Africa.15 A third factor is the series of wars that broke 
out with its neighbour Ethiopia.16 Finally, we must mention the 
lack of technical systems on merchant ships to protect against 
intruders, or even armed security personnel, meaning that the 
ships are easier to board.17 The Somali pirates are classified as the 
best equipped and best organised compared to pirate groups 
in other regions like Malaga Bay, Guinea Bay, or the Caribbean 
islands. The pirates in Somalia carry automatic weapons and 
shoulder-held missiles, and use speedboats to move towards 
their targets.18 Considering all of these factors, piracy and armed 
robbery has become an almost inevitable result in the Somali 
case.
3. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS: AUTHORISING 
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA
The International Law of the Sea laid out in the 1982 
Convention allows the States to intervene to combat maritime 
piracy on the high seas or in an exclusive economic zone. Under 
Article 105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea 1982, the States can exercise or not this repression 
without entailing any international responsibility, especially 
13. Flagel, A., Le renouveau de la piraterie internationale, these  present a l’universite 
de la Nouvelle- Caledonie, le 28 fevrier 2013, 343p , 170
14. Piette, The Fight against Maritime Piracy under French Law, 3 Montesquieu Law 
Review (2015) 2. And for more detailes see: Farah, Supra note 8, at 8.  
15. Flagel, A., Le renouveau de la piraterie internationale, thèse présenté a l’université 
de la Nouvelle- Calédonie, le 28 février 2013, p.166. : Hoesslin, Von, La nébuleuse 
pirate en Somalie, (2012) 56 Diplomatie 42 ; available at: https://www.diplomatie.
gouv.fr/fr/conseils-aux-voyageurs/informations-pratiques/risques/piraterie-
maritime/
16. Amirelle, Supra note 9, at 105.
17. See article 9 of the Revise Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy, 
Armed Robbery, against Ships, and illicit maritime activity in the Western Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden Area, in 17 January 2017, p. 70.
18. Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of 
Somalia, 20 European Journal of International Law (2009) 400.
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since the Convention does not criminalise piracy or include 
measures for international criminal cooperation and legal 
assistance to extradite persons accused or convicted of piracy.19 
In the Somali Case, unlawful acts are committed in the Somali 
Territorial Sea, and the interference of countries is considered a 
violation of the sovereignty of a Member State of the UN, even 
if it is actually described as a failed State. However, sovereignty 
is a well-established concept in Customary International Law 
and, therefore, is still enjoyed even by failed States. What is 
committed in the Somali Territorial Sea differs from what the 
1982 Convention refers to, as in the Convention piracy is implied 
in its traditional sense.20
In the Somali Case, foreign ships and crews are detained, 
and the owning company or flag State of the ship is given a 
ransom demand for money in exchange for their release. The aim 
of the detention is, therefore, not the pillaging of the cargo or 
ship’s resources. As a result, we are facing a new form of maritime 
piracy that differs greatly from what prevailed for centuries. In our 
opinion, this new form is not described as maritime terrorism21 
despite the fact that the Security Council Resolution No. 1838 of 
2008 describes it as such.22 In view of the seriousness of these 
acts committed in Somalia and their serious impact on the 
security of maritime navigation and international trade routes, 
the intervention of the Security Council was necessary to limit 
attacks against commercial vessels. 
Consequently, between May 2008 and December 2019, 
the Council issued more than thirty binding resolutions based 
on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, describing the situation in 
the Somali Territorial Sea as a threat to international peace and 
security. This means that the Council can delegate a State to 
take action to suppress these crimes, including the use of armed 
force.23 Some scholars perceive that the Council intervened in this 
way, and issued more resolutions related to similar global issues, 
due to the steady rise of piracy and the serious threat to the 
freedom of navigation and shipping, both of which negatively 
affect giant international financial institutions and the global 
economy.24
These Resolutions, since May 2008, consider that any foreign 
military intervention to suppress piracy and armed robbery 
requires the explicit and written consent of the SIG in order to 
carry out these measures. The Somali Interim Government sent 
a list of countries that will pursue and prosecute pirates in its 
regional sea to the Secretary-General of the UN.25 Moreover, 
Council Resolutions allow regional organisations to intervene to 
crack down on illegal acts. In this light, NATO and the EU launched 
two operations, Ocean Shield and Atlanta, to repress piracy in the 
Gulf of Aden, and both operations are ongoing in the Somali 
Territorial Sea twelve years after their launch.26 With regard to 
the list prepared by the Somali Interim Government, the Council 
Resolutions on the Somali Case were based on Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. This means that the commitment to cooperate with 
the Council to carry out repressive measures is obligatory for all 
Member States of the UN, and not to the specific group included 
in the Somali Interim Government list. Because piracy qualifies 
as a threat to International Peace and Security, the list prepared 
by the Somali Government for a limited number of Countries 
was a matter of consideration. For example, when the Council 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 
1995, it obligated all States to cooperate fully, and any breaches 
were considered to jeopardise international peace and security.27 
In the Somali case, if we assume that a country excluded from 
the Somali Interim Government list discovered a pirate group 
destined to target a foreign cargo ship in the Somali Territorial 
Sea, would it stand by and allow the pirates to commit the crime? 
Would such a problem be a violation of the Council’s Resolution 
on Somalia? On the other hand, the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 1982, especially Articles 100–107 consider 
that the State’s exercise of its full competence to repress piracy 
19. Garrod, supra note 6 at 574.
20. For the Anglo-Saxon Scholars, the Classical Piracy defined as Attack against all 
nations indiscriminately and affect the interest of maritime trade throughout the 
world and by this crime we are all inquired, and individuals in turn can find their 
personal rights violated.  Read: Bantekas, I, Supra note 2, at 156.
21. Maritime terrorism is define as (any act of unlawful violence directed against ships, 
individuals, goods, or property that they carry, or against maritime targets with 
the aim of direct or indirect influence on the government of a particular country 
or any other body to achieve political goals). This crime shares with piracy that 
they threaten the security of the International Community as a whole, and they 
constitute international Crimes that threaten the safety of Marine Ships and 
freedom of Navigation. In addition, both require the use of violence against ships, 
people and the money they carry.  While Piracy differs from Maritime Terrorism in 
that the Second is not required to be committed on high seas, it can be committed 
in the Territorial Sea of the State, unlike Piracy in its classical sense, which stipulates 
its commission on high Seas and the Exclusive Economic Zone.  The development 
of means of using Maritime Terrorism is the opposite of Piracy, which is still using 
traditional methods. In addition, Piracy is accomplish by fulfilling two conditions, 
the means used and the target, which is the attacking ship and the assaulted 
ship. While in maritime terrorism, it may be committee from inside the assaulted 
ship, that is, by its crew or passengers.  The goal of maritime terrorism is vital 
and strategic, unlike Piracy, whose aim is to plunder or hijack the ship to obtain 
the funds it carries. Finally, Maritime terrorism aims to cause the largest possible 
number of losses to the attacked ship, while piracy aims to reduce losses and 
achieve more profit. See: Eudeline’ Le Terrorisme Maritime, Une Nouvelle Forme 
de Guerre, 2 Outre –Terre Revue (2010) 87 s; available at : https://www.cairn.info/
revue-outre-terre1-2010-2-page-83.htm
22. Farah, Hamza, Supra note 8, at 12. See also: Guilfoyle, Supra note 2, at 146. 
23. The Security Council adopted between May 2008 and December 2019 the following 
Resolutions: 1814-1816-1838-1844-1846-1851-1897-1918-1950-1976-2015-2020-
2077-2125-2184-2246-2316-2383-2442-2500.
24. Warnir, R., The Prosecution of Pirates in National Courts, 2014, 22.
25. Martin, Supra note 7, at 506. 
26. Maniatis, Approche Juridique de la Piraterie, 21 Neptunes revue (2016) 5. In the 
same meaning, read Lorca, Harmonization of National Criminal Laws on Maritime 
Piracy: A Regulatory Proposal for the Crime of Piracy and its Penalties, 23 European 
Journal of Criminal Research’ (2016) 117.
27. Guilfoyle, Supra note 2, at 152.
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is optional, not mandatory. In other words, the country whose 
warship sees a cargo ship being attacked by a group of pirates 
has a choice between interfering to prevent piracy or not.
In addition, the UNSC resolutions related to the Somali 
Case allow the delegated State to intervene by pursuing 
suspects of piracy, not only in the Somali Territorial Sea, but 
also on the Somali mainland.28 This is a dangerous and negative 
development with respect to the principle of State sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. In this paper, we argue that the degree 
of seriousness of the Council’s own Resolutions does not change 
by limiting maritime and land intervention to Somalia only, or by 
stipulating that the Somali Case is an exception and, therefore, 
does not create an International Customary Law. Rather, the 
emergence of an International Customary Law does not currently 
arise through a Security Council Resolution or a UN General 
Assembly Recommendation; instead, it arises from the frequency 
of an action over an uninterrupted period of time.29 Accordingly, 
we believe that the Council’s assertion of the specificity of the 
Somali case is unacceptable. Every legal issue has international 
and even internal importance and, therefore, it can be used as a 
rule or an international legal principle at any time.30
4. PROSECUTION OF SOMALI PIRATES: DELAYED 
NATIONAL JUSTICE
It is customary for the Somali Coast Guard forces to do 
their duty to prosecute the perpetrators of maritime piracy 
in the Somali Territorial Sea and bring them to trial before 
the Somali Criminal Courts. The latter, in turn, issue criminal 
rulings that vary between ruling on innocence, incarceration, 
imprisonment, or even all the way to execution in some cases, in 
accordance with the applicable Penal Code and provisions in the 
Somali penal institutions. However, since this scenario has not 
been implemented for three decades, the Security Council has 
intervened and, as indicated above, issued a series of resolutions 
calling on United Nations’ Members States to suppress piracy 
and armed robbery in the Somali Territorial Sea and to prosecute 
those suspected of piracy who are Somali citizens.31
These resolutions evolved to move from demanding 
prosecution to requiring states to prosecute pirates before their 
courts or before the courts of another country, in accordance with 
either their national laws or the international law in application of 
universal jurisdiction. Above all, we must consider the position 
of the Somali legal system with regard to the crime of piracy 
committed in its territorial waters. This is especially significant 
given that the United Nations always affirms that its priority is 
to apply the Somali law against the perpetrators of piracy and 
armed robbery. In other words, we may question why the Somali 
Penal Code and other Somali laws, if any, are not applied, and 
whether there is any justification for the Security Council, with 
its Resolutions, to call for the application of comprehensive 
jurisdiction by other countries.
In this regard, we can say first that the Somali criminal law 
in force (Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Law) is based on four 
contradictory legal sources: Italian law, Anglo-Saxon law, Islamic 
law, and Somalia’s prevailing tribal customs.32 With regard to the 
Somali Penal Code promulgated in 1962, it was derived, if not 
quoted, in the majority of its provisions from the Italian Penal 
Code, while the Code of Criminal Procedures is derived from 
Anglo-Saxon law. These two laws are still in force in all parts 
of Somalia, even in the regions that announced their official 
(Somaliland) or administrative secession (Puntland).33
The main criticism of the Somali Penal Code is that it does 
not refer to the crime of maritime piracy in its texts despite 
Somalia’s being a maritime nation with more than 3.000 km of 
coasts, and piracy being a historical and ancient crime. For many, 
the lack of stipulation in the Penal Code is due to two reasons. 
First, there was no commitment in the period before the collapse 
of the State in 1991 and, thus, no call for an amendment to the 
law from its promulgation until the fall of the political regime. 
Second, to punish piracy crimes, the Somali judiciary could have 
employed provisions on kidnapping crimes according to Articles 
485–486 of the Penal Code. These two texts relate to the crimes of 
kidnapping persons in exchange for a financial ransom whether 
committed on land, sea or air, as the text does not specify the 
place of commission. The punishment stipulated in the law 
ranges between eight to eighteen years in prison, depending on 
any aggravated circumstances or exemptions, which might affect 
the punishment accordingly.34
Other difficulties related to the implementation of the 
Somali Penal Code relate to the first source of criminalization 
in the Code, which is Islamic Sharia. According to this Sharia, 
maritime piracy is the crime of brigandry (hiraba). Under this law, 
28. The number of Council Resolutions that allowed States to intervene on the Somali 
mainland to pursue suspected pirates reached 7; available at: https://un.org
29. In all UN Resolutions related the Somalia, we found the following text  (…Affirms 
that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the 
situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities 
of Member States under International Law. Including any rights or obligations 
under The Convention with respect to any other situation, and underscores in 
particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary 
International Law, ).See The Security Council Resolution N. 1897, in 30 November 
2009, p.4.
30. Garrod, supra note 6, at 575.
31. Warnir, Supra note 21, at 21.
32. See the Report of the Secretary General on the modalities for the establishment of 
specialized Somali anti-piracy Courts, S/2011/30, p. 40.
33. See: The Somali Penal Code, N 5, in 16 December 1962, and the Somali Code of 
Criminal Procedures N. 1, in June 1963. 
34. Shnider, Universal Jurisdiction over Operation of a Pirate Ship: The Legality of the 
Evolving Piracy Definition in Regional Prosecutions, 38 North California Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation (2013) 522 ; available at : https://
www https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol38/iss2/3/
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a cruel punishment equivalent to torture was imposed: cutting 
off the left leg and the right hand and, in case of recidivism, 
the right leg and the left hand. These penalties contradict the 
modern criminal policy of reforming and rehabilitating convicts 
wherever their crimes are and, therefore, it is not realistic for use 
in the Somali Penal Code.
To overcome these difficulties, the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has provided substantial and 
generous support to local governments in the Puntland and 
Somaliland regions to establish effective judicial institutions and 
train judicial, legal, and technical personnel.  Its support included 
both material assistance and participation in the legislation of 
laws punishing piracy in these regions. Here, we note the success 
of the programme’s efforts in Somaliland, where in 2012 a local 
law was legislated to combat maritime piracy.35
With regard to the Somaliland Law to Combat Maritime 
Piracy, it is classified as a special criminal law. According to Article 
12, it is part of the Penal Code in force and this is the Law of 
1962; however, no Penal Code was issued in Somaliland, and the 
Somali Penal Code of 1962 is still in force alongside the Somali 
Penal Procedures Law. This means that all criticism of the Somali 
Law remains the same, with the exception that in adapting the 
act of piracy and punishment, the new law identified the action 
committed as maritime piracy and set its punishment as 5–20 
years in prison.36 
Moreover, the new law limits criminal jurisdiction to the 
Somaliland Courts for all the piracy crimes committed in the 
Territorial Sea of Somaliland despite the non-demarcation of 
the maritime boundaries between the Republic of Somalia, 
a signatory to the 1982 Convention, and Somaliland unless 
the crime is subject to the jurisdiction of another country or 
criminal jurisdiction under the Common International Law 
and the intention is universal jurisdiction. It appears that, with 
the influence of the UNODC, the legislator of the law aimed to 
immediately address piracy in the Somaliland waters as much as 
possible.37
Despite the issuance of a somewhat recent law compared 
to the laws in force in Somalia, it is unfortunate that this law has 
not to date been widely applied, mainly because of the weakness 
of the judicial institutions in Somaliland. This is in addition to the 
fact that influential bodies benefit from the practice of maritime 
piracy and, thus, do not allow the prosecution of pirates before 
local courts. To demonstrate this apparent weakness, in August 
2019, the Somaliland authorities released 19 convicted pirates 
who had been moved from the Seychelles to Somaliland, 
based on a Memorandum of Understanding, to spend their 
sentences in Somaliland.38 However, the latter released them. 
This was qualified as a violation of Somaliland’s obligation to 
the Seychelles and the international community to imprison 
the convicted persons within two prisons constructed with 
funds from the United Nations, which also trained their cadres in 
previous years.  In the light of the above-mentioned difficulties 
in applying the Somali law before the Somali courts, it became 
imperative for the Security Council to find a legal solution that 
achieves justice.
5. CONCLUSION
Currently, the UN Security Council still plays a decisive 
role in the international campaign against the Somali piracy. 
This achievement is considered result from unanimity of the 
five permanent members of the Security Council and their 
satisfaction with the gravity of this crime and its impact on their 
commercial interests and national security. The Security Council 
has adopted more than forty resolutions in the past twelve years, 
including those that promote procedures related to the re-
establishment of judicial institutions (i.e. the courts) in Somalia. 
These institutions were wholly damaged in the war, along with 
the legislative reform of the criminal laws in Somalia enacted six 
decades ago.*
Unfortunately, however, the Council has failed in its efforts 
on behalf of the Somalian judicial institutions. On the positive side, 
the Council called all the member States of the UN to integrate 
the principle of universal jurisdiction into their national criminal 
laws in order to prosecute piracy before national courts, due to 
the incapability of carrying out the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 1982 upon the Somali situation. However, 
the application of universal jurisdiction by these countries faces 
a problem related to the difference in the sanctions imposed by 
the Courts: in the northern countries five years in prison is the 
maximum, while in the southern countries piracy incurs death 
penalty.
35. The Somali Land law combatting the Piracy, N 52, in September 2012, also See : The 
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, S/2013/623, in 21 October 2013, p. 5.
36. The main provision is the Article 5 of the Law against the Piracy which stated that 
1) An act of piracy at a ship or aircraft owned  by Somaliland  shall come under 
the jurisdiction of the Republic of Somaliland courts unless the ship or aircraft 
was, at the time of the commission of the offence,  situated in the territorial waters 
of another country or that act is assigned, under international law, to another 
jurisdiction; 2) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law and regardless 
of the nationality of the accused persons, the courts of Somaliland shall have 
jurisdiction to try any offences of piracy committed within the Somaliland sea or 
outside the Somaliland sea if committed in an area not falling within the sea of any 
other country when the Somaliland Coastal Forces detains the accused persons). 
37. Lorca, Supra note 23, at 118.   
38. It should be mentioned that the Security Council recognized in its resolutions 
the weakness of the Somali criminal laws, even the inability of the Somali 
Courts for pursuit and prosecution of the pirates. For more details read the 
following Resolutions: S/RES/1918(2010)-S/RES/1897(2009)-S/RES/1950(2010)-S/
RES/1976(2011)-S/RES/2125(2013), S/RES/2246(2015)-S/RES/2500(2019).
* The resolutions mentioned to re-establish the judicial institutions in Somali are: N. 
2500-N 2383 -N 2246 –N 2184 – N 2125 – N 2077 – N 2015 – N 1976.
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